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Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is the technology to transmit secret information directly
through a quantum channel without neither key nor ciphertext. It provides us with a secure communication
structure that is fundamentally different from the one that we use today. In this Letter, we report the first
measurement-device-independent(MDI) QSDC protocol with sequences of entangled photon pairs and single
photons. It eliminates security loopholes associated with the measurement device. In addition, the MDI tech-
nique doubles the communication distance compared to those without using the technique. We also give a
protocol with linear optical Bell-basis measurement, where only two of the four Bell-basis states could be mea-
sured. When the number of qubit in a sequence reduces to 1, the MDI-QSDC protocol reduces to a deterministic
MDI quantum key distribution protocol, which is also presented in the Letter.
Introduction A secure communication structure is usually
composed of a key distribution channel and a ciphertext trans-
mission channel, as shown in Fig. 1a. Usually, ciphertext
is encoded with the AES cipher [1], and key is distributed
using RSA public cryptosystem [2]. There are three poten-
tial security loopholes in this structure: leak of key during
distribution, loss of key in storage and in transition at users’
sites, and interception of ciphertext in transmission. Quantum
principle enables legitimate users to detect Eve, and quantum
key distribution (QKD) offers provably security for key agree-
ment [3, 4]. In QKD, Alice sends random numbers encoded in
quantum states to Bob. They can detect Eve by publicly com-
paring some samples. If Eve is found, they discard the trans-
mitted data because all or part of them has already leaked. If
they are certain that there is no eavesdropping, the transmit-
ted data will be used as key to encode a message into cipher-
text. QKD eliminates in principle the security loophole in the
key distribution channel, but the other two loopholes still per-
sist. An Eve can always intercept the ciphertext and store them
for cryptanalysis. Only Vernam’s one-time-pad was shown to
be perfectly secure [5, 6] provided the key is absolutely pro-
tected. Though happened very rarely, loss of key or repeated
use of key still occurred, with disastrous consequences [7].
QSDC [8–10] transmits a message directly over a quantum
channel. It does not use key, hence there is no key distribution
and key storage and management. The security loopholes as-
sociated with the key are all eliminated. QSDC establishes a
secure quantum channel first, and any attempt to intercept the
QSDC channel would obtain only random numbers, hence the
security loophole associated with the ciphertext is also wiped
out. As shown in Fig.1b, QSDC eliminates all three security
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Figure 1. (coloronline)(a) Structure of a general secure communica-
tion. Usually key distribution is completed using RSA. With QKD,
unconditional key distribution can be achieved. (b) The structure of
quantum secure direct communication. It has no key distribution, key
storage and management, and no ciphertext. It eliminates all three
security loopholes in a general secure communication structure.
loopholes in traditional secure communication, and changes
fundamentally the structure. This could lead further changes
in future secure communication.
Recently, there have been remarkable developments in ex-
perimental QSDC. A single-photon QSDC protocol with er-
ror correction code was proposed and experimentally demon-
strated [11]. It has shown that QSDC works in noisy and lossy
environment. QSDC protocols based on Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pair in Refs.[8, 9] have been experimentally re-
alized using atomic quantum memory in optical platform [12],
and fiber-photonics devices at a distance of a few kilo-meters
[13] respectively. They have attracted widespread attention
both in the academic and security circles [14].
All components in a practical setting have defects and im-
perfections, and they can be used to steal secret key in prac-
tical QKD systems [15–19]. Among these loopholes, those
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2in the measurement devices are dominant. One solution to
this problem is to fabricate near perfect devices. However it
takes somehow long time to advance related fabrication tech-
nology, and there is always some degree of inaccuracy in any
real device. An alternative way is to design new protocols,
taking into account the imperfections existent in these devices.
This has been successfully done in QKD in the measurement-
device-independent(MDI) protocol [20]. In the MDI tech-
nique, the measurement-device is in principle in the hands of
an untrusted Charlie who performs the measurement. It elim-
inates the security loopholes in the measurement part of the
system.
QSDC is secure under ideal conditions, such as perfect
quantum source, noiseless channel, perfect devices and de-
tectors [8–10, 21, 22]. In order for QSDC to go for prac-
tical application, measurement-device-independent QSDC is
essential. In this Letter, we propose a measurement-device-
independent QSDC (MDI-QSDC) protocol based on single
photons and entangled photon pairs. In this scheme, Alice pre-
pares a sequence of EPR-pairs, and Bob prepares a sequence
of single photon states and "send" them to Alice through tele-
portation, in which the Bell-basis measurement is performed
by an untrusted Charlie. Then after checking the security, Al-
ice encodes her message in the teleported single photons, and
sends them to Charlie who performs the single qubit measure-
ment for Bob. MDI-QSDC enhances greatly the security of
QSDC under realistic condition. In addition to the security
advantage, MDI-QSDC effectively doubles the communica-
tion distance because both Alice and Bob send their qubits
to the measurement-device which lies in the middle of them.
We also give a protocol with linear optics Bell-basis measure-
ment, where only two of the four Bell-basis states could be
measured. QSDC enables the direct secure transmission of
information by the block data transmission technique [8, 9],
in which the quantum information carriers are transmitted in a
block of large number of qubits. When the number of qubit in
a block is reduced to 1, the MDI-QSDC protocol is reduced to
a deterministic MDI-QKD protocol, which is also described
toward the end of the Letter.
Method The protocol uses both Bell-basis states,
|φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉) /
√
2, |ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉) /
√
2, (1)
and single qubit states |±〉 = (|0〉± |1〉)/√2, |0〉 and |1〉. The
protocol consists of the following 6 steps, and we suppose
Alice sends information to Bob. The protocol is illustrated in
Fig.2.
Step 1) Alice and Bob prepare ordered qubits sequences.
Alice produces a sequence of N + t0 EPR-pairs in Bell-state
|ψ−12〉 in her site. She divides her EPR pair sequence into two
single qubit sequences, SAh and SAt, whose qubits are part-
ners each other in the EPR pairs. She also prepares a sequence
of t1 number of single qubits whose states are randomly in
one of the |+〉, |−〉, |0〉 states, |1〉, and inserts them into SAt
in random positions so as to form an ordered sequence PA of
N + t0 + t1 single qubits. Meanwhile, Bob prepares a se-
Bob’s state |φ+23〉 |φ−23〉 |ψ+23〉 |ψ−23〉
|0〉3 − |1〉1 − |1〉1 − |0〉1 − |0〉1
|1〉3 |0〉1 − |0〉1 − |1〉1 − |1〉1
|+〉3 |−〉1 − |+〉1 |−〉1 − |+〉1
|−〉3 − |+〉1 |−〉1 |+〉1 − |−〉1
Table I. |ψ−〉12 |q〉3 in terms of Bell-states of qubit 2 and 3. In front
of each term, there is a coefficient 1/2.
quence of N + t0 + t1 single qubits, PB , whose states are
randomly in one of the four states |+〉, |−〉, |0〉 and |1〉.
The EPR pairs in Alice’s side are used for directly commu-
nicating secret information, and the single qubits are used for
security check.
Step 2). Alice sends sequence PA, and Bob sends sequence
PB to Charlie. Charlie performs Bell-basis measurement on
every pair of qubits he receives from Alice and Bob, and pub-
lishes the results. The Bell-basis measurement of a single
qubit from an EPR-pair of PA with a single qubit from PB
leads to the collapse of Alice’s EPR-pair into one of the four
single qubit states, {|+〉, |−〉, |0〉, |1〉} with equal probabili-
ties, as shown in Table I. The state after measurement is only
known to Bob, and unknown to both Alice and Eve. This is a
quantum teleportation process in a slightly complicated man-
ner, where Bob’s single qubit is almost teleported Alice, apart
from a unitary operation UT to transform Alice’s correspond-
ing qubit in SAh into Bob’s state. UT is known to all Alice,
Bob and Charlie after Charlie announces his Bell-basis mea-
surement result. For instance, for |ψ−12〉 |0〉3, UT = I if the
Bell-basis measurement yields |ψ+23〉 or |ψ−23〉; UT = iσY , if
the Bell-basis measurement yields |φ+23〉 or |φ−23〉.
Step 3). Security check. Alice publishes the positions and
states of the t1 single qubits in PA, and Bob also publishes
the corresponding states of the corresponding qubits in PB .
This security check is identical to that in the MDI-QKD. For
those qubits whose basis are different, a Bell-basis measure-
ment will yield any one of the four Bell-basis states, as shown
in Eq. (2),
|+〉 |0〉 = + 12 |φ+〉+ 12 |φ−〉+ 12 |ψ+〉+ 12 |ψ−〉 ,
|−〉 |1〉 = − 12 |φ+〉+ 12 |φ−〉+ 12 |ψ+〉+ 12 |ψ−〉 . (2)
There are not useful for security check. The decomposition
of qubits with identical basis in terms of Bell-basis states are
shown in Eq. (3).
|+〉 |+〉 = 1√
2
(|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉) , |+〉 |−〉 = 1√
2
(|φ−〉 − |ψ−〉) ,
|0〉 |0〉 = 1√
2
(|φ+〉+ |φ−〉) , |0〉 |1〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ+〉+ |ψ−〉) .
(3)
A Bell-basis measurement can only obtain one of two Bell-
basis states. Charlie’s eavesdropping will have a 50% proba-
bility to obtain the other two Bell-basis states, hence increases
3       
 
 Charlie 
BS 
D3 
D4 
Alice Bob 
D1 
D2 
PBS2 PBS1 
BSM 
Figure 2. (coloronline)Sketch for experimental implementation of
MDI-QSDC
the error rate. If the error rate is above the threshold, then the
process will be terminated. Otherwise, go to the next step.
Step 4). Encoding message by Alice. Bob announces the
basis of his remaining qubits. Alice’s encoding operation U
is the product of two operations, U = UmUT . The first one
is the unitary operation to complete the quantum teleportation
UT , and the other operation is the message encoding operation
Um, namely I for 0, which does not change the state at all, and
iσY for 1, which flips the state. To ensure the integrity of the
message, Alice also encodes t0 qubits with random numbers,
which are positioned randomly in SAh.
Step 5). Alice sends the sequence to Charlie. Charlie first
performs unitary operations, UBs, so that the qubit basis be-
comes { |0〉, |1〉 } , namely UB = I if the basis of Bob’s qubit
is {|0〉, |1〉}, and UB = H if the basis of Bob’s qubit is {|+〉,
|−〉}. Charlie measures the qubits in sequence SAh in σZ ba-
sis and announces the results. Upon these results, Bob can
derive the message and random numbers encoded by Alice.
Step 6). Integrity check. Alice announces the random num-
bers of the t0 check qubits. If the error rate is below thresh-
old, the transmission is safe. Alice and Bob conclude that
the direct communication is secure and complete the session.
Otherwise, they conclude the communication is tampered by
Eve or the untrusted Charlie. It should be emphasized that
Eve or Charlie’s eavesdropping at step 5) could not steal any
information, it can only disturb the communication. Integrity
check ensures the message Bob receives is correct.
Security analysis The security check in step 3) is identi-
cal to that in MDI-QKD. After the security check, the security
of teleportation process of Bob’s qubits is ascertained. Before
the Bell-basis measurement, the density matrix of qubit in Al-
ice’s sequence PA is composed qubits from N + t0 entangled
EPR-pairs whose density is Tr1(|ψ−12〉 〈ψ−12|) and a sequence
of t1 qubits randomly in four states, whose density is I/2,
ρA =
N + t0
N + t0 + t1
I
2
+
t1
N + t0 + t1
I
2
=
I
2
. (4)
The density matrix of qubit in sequence PB is I/2. After
the security check in step 3, state |q3〉 of Bob’s qubit is "tele-
ported" to Alice, in the form of U−1T |q3〉. Alice, Bob and
Charlie all know the explicit form of UT from the result of
Bell-basis measurement. Alice and Charlie do not know |q3〉.
After Alice’s encoding and Charlie’s measurement, Um |q3〉
is announced publicly. Bob can derive Um by comparing
Um |q3〉 with his initial state |q3〉. Under noisy channel, after
the security check, Alice could choose a classical linear code
for the remaining qubits. The procedures are almost identical
to those in the Shor-Preskill type of proof BB84 QKD proto-
col in Ref. [23]. The difference between QSDC and QKD is
that the error correction encoding must be implemented before
Alice sends her sequence ofN+t0 encoded qubits to Charlie.
In the limit of large qubit numbers, the error rate threshold is
11%.
MDI-QSDC protocol using linear optical devices Using
linear optics, only two of the four Bell-basis states, |ψ±〉, can
be distinctively measured. Hence the MDI-QSDC protocol
should be revised accordingly. Some modification to the 6
steps with full-Bell-basis measurements are described here.
Step 1 is the same. In step 2, only |ψ±〉 can be obtained after
the Bell-basis measurements. When the measured result is
|φ±〉, there is simply no clicks in the detectors. Therefore
with high probability, only half of the qubits in PA and PB
can give the results |ψ±〉 when measured using linear optical
device, as can be seen from Table I. There is no change in step
3, and eavesdropper will be found in the similar way as that
in the MDI-QKD. There is no change in step 4, the encoding
operation is UmUT . Steps 5 and 6 are also the same.
Deterministic MDI-QKD protocol In a QKD protocol,
eavesdropper can be found only after certain number of qubits
have gone through the whole transmission process. Therefore
when Eve is found, she has already acquired some transmit-
ted data, which is disastrous for direct communicating secret
message. In QSDC, block transmission is essential to prevent
information leak before Eve’s detection [8]. For instance, in
the security check in step 3, the comparisons of t1 check pairs
out of a block of N + t0 + t1 pairs give a good estimate of
the error rate, and ensures the security of qubits in SAh before
they are encoded with message and sent to Charlie. If the se-
curity of SAh is not assured, Charlie or Eve could eavesdrop,
for instance, Charlie does not make the Bell-basis measure-
ment and stores the qubit in PA instead. After Alice encodes
the message on her qubit in SAh and sends it to Charlie, Char-
lie can perform Bell-basis measurement on the encoded qubit
from SAh and the stored qubit from PA to read Alice’s en-
coded bit. Of course, Charlie’s cheating will be found after
dozens of rounds of transmission, the data transmitted before
Alice and Bob finding her will be lost completely.
Therefore the number of qubit in a block is reduced to 1, the
4QSDC protocol is no longer secure in sending secret message.
Instead, it becomes a deterministic QKD protocol, namely it
can still transmit random numbers deterministically and find
eavesdropper after a session is finished. If an eavesdropper is
found, they discard the transmitted data, otherwise they retain
the transmitted data as raw key. The detailed procedure for
the deterministic MDI-QKD is given below.
Step 1) Alice produces with probability pk = (N +
t0)/(N + t0 + t1) an EPR pair in state |ψ−12〉, and with prob-
ability pc = 1 − pk a single qubit (labeled qubit 2) randomly
in one of the four states |+〉, |−〉, |0〉 and |1〉. Meanwhile Bob
prepares qubit 3 randomly in one of the four states |+〉, |−〉,
|0〉, |1〉.
Step 2). Alice sends qubit 2, and Bob sends qubit 3 to Char-
lie. Charlie performs Bell-basis measurement on the pair of
qubits and publishes the result.
Step 3) After hearing from Charlie the Bell-basis mea-
surement result, Bob announces the basis of his qubit in the
Bell-basis measured pair. Alice performs encoding operation
UmUT on qubit 1, wherem is a random bit and determined by
Alice, UT is the unitary operation to complete the teleporta-
tion. Alice sends the encoded qubit 1 to Charlie, and Charlie
first performs a unitary operation UB so that the qubit basis
becomes |0〉, |1〉, namely UB = I if the basis of Bob’s qubit
is |0〉 , |1〉, andUB = H if the basis of Bob’s qubit is |+〉 , |−〉.
Then Charlie measures qubit 1 in σZ basis and publishes the
result.
Step 4) After sufficient number N + t0+ t1 of transmission
has been performed ( N + t0 number of EPR-pairs and t1
number of single qubits), Alice announces the initial states of
the t1 single qubits and Bob announces the initial states of
corresponding single qubits, they will get an estimate of the
error rate. If the error rate is above a threshold, they conclude
the transmission insecure and terminate the process. If the
error rate is below a threshold, they conclude the transmission
is secure. Then Alice announces the positions and bit values
of the t0 random check bits, Alice and Bob estimate the error
rate. If the error rate is small, then they conclude the key
distribution is safe. Alice and Bob will keep these N random
numbers as key.
This MDI-QKD protocol does not use the block transmis-
sion technique, the security is confirmed only after the distri-
bution of the random numbers. This protocol could not send
secret information directly, because all the transmitted data
would leak to Eve before her detection. Classical communi-
cations are deterministic, but it cannot found eavesdropping.
QKD can find eavesdropper, but cannot prevent Eve to access
the transmitted data. QSDC can find eavesdropping and pre-
vent Eve from obtaining the transmitted data.
Discussion and Summary We proposed a MDI-QSDC
protocol using both EPR-pairs and single qubits. We also give
a simplified version using linear optics devices, which only
distinguishes two Bell-basis states. These MDI-QSDC pro-
tocols can be implemented with the present-day technology.
Using the decoy method [24, 25] and the ILM-GLLP method
[26, 27], faint laser pulses and EPR-pairs from down conver-
sion could be used with minor revisions to the protocols pre-
sented in this Letter. When the number of qubit in a block is
reduced to 1, QSDC protocols reduce to deterministic QKD
protocols.
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